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 „Will we see the emergence of cybercrime cartels?‟2 
 
Abstract  
 
Cybercrime has become an integral part of the transnational threat landscape 
and conjures up pressing images of nefarious and increasingly complex online 
activity. More recently, the concept of „organised crime‟ has been attributed to 
cybercriminality. There has been subsequent disagreement and confusion 
concerning whether such crime is a derivation of traditional organised crime or 
an evolution of such crime within the online space. This opaque state of affairs 
has been exacerbated by the relative lack of clear evidence attesting to and 
supporting either scenario. Technological advances have always been used to 
the advantage of the criminal fraternity. The crucial question that remains is 
whether those advances have merely facilitated the commission of physical 
crime or whether in fact they have led to the creation of a new wave of 
traditional, but virtual, organised crime.  
 
Introduction 
 
In broad terms, the debate surrounding the actual and/or prospective 
involvement of traditional organised crime groups in cybercriminal activity is 
characterised by a tension between logic and pragmatism. Logic would dictate 
that traditional organised crime groups will engage with cybercriminal 
endeavours as fervently as they will with any low risk, high profit non-virtual 
criminal activity. Pragmatism on the other hand would suggest that it remains 
questionable whether such groups either need that engagement or indeed have 
the capacity to exploit the cyber environment to the extent that their capital 
investment would produce the desired and appropriate financial gains. 
 
Defining ‘cybercrime’ 
 
Yar
3
 argues that „[i]t has become more or less obligatory to begin any 
discussion of “cybercrime” by referring to the most dramatic criminological 
quandary it raises, namely, does it denote the emergence of a “new” form of 
crime and/or criminality?‟ Grabosky4 sought at a relatively early juncture to 
address that question by suggesting that cybercrime was simply a case of „old 
wine in new bottles‟, that is „…less a question of something completely 
different than a recognizable crime committed in a completely different way.‟ 
In a similar vein, Nisbett
5
 has argued that „[c]yber crime is on the increase. 
This does not necessarily mean that there are in fact any new crimes; rather 
there are new methods of committing existing crimes and better ways of 
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detecting them‟. Interestingly, Wall6 has noted that „…when so-called cases of 
cybercrime come to court, they often have the familiar ring of the “traditional” 
rather than the “cyber” about them‟. 
 
Crime, like nature, however, abhors a vacuum. It has accordingly always 
seemed inevitable perhaps that traditional organised crime groups would 
positively rush to fill the void for illicit product placement deemed to present 
itself in the context of cyberspace.  It might be assumed, therefore, that an 
evaluation of the purported involvement of traditional crime groups in cyber 
crime would be a relatively simple affair. Certainly, the literature, broadly 
defined, is replete with references to „cybercrime‟ and more recently to 
„organised‟ cybercrime. Unfortunately, the mere assertion in much of that 
literature that such crime exists (both in a general sense and in an organised 
form) has been routinely transmuted, as if by osmosis, into tangible fact. 
Arguably, however, in many cases those „facts‟ appear to rely as much upon 
anecdote, hearsay, extrapolation and assumption as they do upon objectively 
obtained and verified evidence.  
 
At the basic level of analysis there is no discernible control mechanism in place 
insofar as terminology is concerned. Thus, one might speak of „cybercrime‟, 
„high tech crime‟, „computer crime‟, „technology crime‟, „digital crime‟ and 
„IT crime‟ and be discussing the same and/or different concepts, respectively. 
Achieving any vestige of comparative analysis of the impact of cybercrime 
therefore is fraught with difficulties. Beyond that, the increasingly common 
conflation of cybercrime with the prefix „organised‟ infers the involvement of 
traditional organised crime groups but ultimately alludes to „ordinary‟ 
criminals who happen to operate in cyberspace in an organised manner. 
Equally, it seems common to refer to cybercriminal „groups‟ as if they were of 
equivalent size, complexity, „stature‟ and duration as their traditional, non-
virtual counterparts. This effectively allows cybercriminal groups to achieve 
the semblance of the organisational evolution actually achieved by those 
traditional organised crime groups they are deemed to emulate. In short, there 
remains a confused and confusing plethora of terminology, purported 
parameters and alleged participants of cybercrime as well as concerns over the 
provenance and quality of evidence elicited in support of such activity. These 
are certainly subtle differences but they are important differences nevertheless.  
 
In consequence the term „cybercrime‟ has rapidly become a generic descriptor 
for any malfeasant online behaviour (whatever the relative differences in 
complexity and seriousness) ranging from spam emails and denial of service 
attacks to malware and botnet infiltration. Indeed, a recent IBM survey
7
 on 
cybercrime globally did not in fact define „cybercrime‟ and yet sought 
information from business participants on every continent on the impact of 
such crime. The net effect of such surveys is that the myth of cybercrime is 
perpetuated and the facts of cybercrime become sacrificed at the altar of public 
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perception. It is the very imprecision of the term which has given rise to the 
hyperbole and opacity that surrounds it.  
 
Beyond the broad non-specificity of definition lies an equally amorphous 
conundrum, which forms the heart of this piece, namely, whether „organised‟ 
cyber crime is crime committed by traditional organised crime groups or 
„merely‟ that it is crime committed online in an organised manner. Even at this 
juncture the question is fraught with difficulty. The term „organised‟, when 
applied to traditional organised crime groups, is defined (see, inter alia, the UN 
Convention against Transnational Crime
8
) and subsequently assessments of 
organised crime can gravitate to and from a fixed point. However, „cybercrime‟ 
is seemingly deemed to be „organised‟ once the perpetrator ceases to be the 
archetypal lonely hacker and gravitates instead towards a group of fellow 
lonely hackers. If acting in illegal concert were the sole arbiter of „organised‟ 
crime then any form of criminal behaviour which necessitated any degree of 
planning might be deemed de facto to be organised crime.  
  
Ultimately, however, the Council of Europe
9
 has argued that „[d]ata on 
connections between organised crime and cybercrime are still scarce and do not 
permit a reliable analysis.‟ Thoumi10 suggested that technology can 
democratise crimes because „[t]he fact that smaller players have an easier time 
entering the market is one reason why the notion of the great crime “cartels” 
may increasingly be a myth as the contemporary criminal market places 
changes in origin.‟ The definitional waters have been muddied somewhat by 
comparisons of cyber criminals with traditional organized crime groups. FBI 
agent Thomas Grasso Jr. argued
11
 that Carderplanet „…organized [itself] into 
the same structure as the Italian Mafia‟. Grasso12 also suggested that the 
International Carders‟ Alliance, to which Carderplanet, Mazafaka and IAACA 
(the International Association for the Advancement of Criminal Activity) 
belonged „…is really the heart of organized cybercrime.‟ Christopher Painter,13 
of the Computer Crimes and Intellectual Property Section at the US 
Department of Justice, noted in 2006 that „…[w]e are seeing organized 
criminal groups‟ but that they were in fact „…groups that are organized online 
targeting victims via the Internet.‟ These assertions are somewhat incongruous 
and consequently both sets of assertions do little to clarify the distinction 
between traditional organised crime involvement in cyberspace and criminals 
who simply operated in the online space. 
 
The law enforcement perspective 
 
In truth, fewer terms are destined to create a greater state of apoplexy within 
law enforcement agencies than „cybercrime‟, a fact reflected in part by their 
usual depiction of such crime as „high tech‟ rather than „cyber‟ in nature. 
Indeed, even the term „high tech‟ crime has drawn criticism. Hynds14, for 
example, noted that „[h]igh tech crime is an oxymoron; a classic contradiction 
in terms…It‟s not about technology, it‟s about people.‟ The dislike of the term 
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„cybercrime‟, and particularly its increasing association with the term 
„organised‟, reflects a common belief in such quarters that cybercrime is 
nothing more than ordinary traditional crime enhanced in terms of its 
distribution and impact by the facilitation of technology. Nisbett
15
 (2002) 
maintained that „[e]very advance in technology appears to create a new crime 
alongside it‟ and indeed, technological advances from the mobile telephone to 
the police scanner have historically been used by the criminal fraternity. That 
the complexity of such technology has increased, and continues to increase, 
exponentially does not detract from that fact.  
 
The tension between the law enforcement perspective on the one hand, and the 
assertions within oft-accessed and cited literature on cybercrime on the other, 
may appear to be a little odd given the accepted use of technology by criminals 
generally. It might be argued that to admit the involvement of traditional 
organised crime groups in cybercriminal activity would place law enforcement 
agencies in the unenviable position of having to investigate yet more complex 
virtual crimes within a still predominantly physical law enforcement 
environment. Whilst at the helm of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, J. 
Edgar Hoover refused to acknowledge the existence of organised crime until 
the Kefauver
16
 and McClellan
17
 committees and the highly visible 
Appalachian
18
 meeting rendered continued denial superfluous. For Hoover to 
have admitted the arrival of organised crime would have necessitated a 
concerted response designed to curb it and this was something Hoover could 
not at that time guarantee. Given the general advantage transnational crime 
groups have over law enforcement agencies in terms of the distance they are 
able to place between the commission of crime and its ultimate resolution at the 
hands of the criminal justice system, it might be suggested that a Hoover-like 
dread currently rests upon the heads of law enforcement agencies. However, 
this would be a tad disingenuous given the fact that unlike organised crime in 
the 20
th
 century, cybercrime in the 21
st
 century is arguably more akin to an 
adaptation of existing crime to new technology than the creation of a brand 
new crime type and/or structure. Equally, one might assume that in order to 
operate effectively within the relative complexity of the online environment 
one would have to be organised as a matter of course. In this sense, the debate 
as to whether criminality is organised or not might be deemed somewhat 
redundant. However, given the finite nature of law enforcement resources it 
remains important strategically and logistically for cybercrime efforts to be 
directed at the actual rather than supposed criminals. That, in turn, renders the 
question as to whether one is confronting traditional organised crime in an 
online context, or online criminals who happen to be organised, a practical and 
serious one.  
 
The generic relationship between technology and crime 
 
In 1992 the United Nations Economic and Social Council observed
19
 that 
„[i]nternational experience shows that organized crime has long ago crossed 
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national borders and is today transnational…It should be noted that aspects of 
the evolutionary process undergone by society may make powerful criminal 
organizations even more impenetrable and facilitate the  expansion of their 
illegal activities.‟ An integral feature of that societal evolution has of course 
been the development and utilisation of technology and its associated 
components. More than a decade ago it was suggested that information and 
communication technology would play a prominent role in defining what was 
likely to become of greater value to a criminal in the future and might dictate 
that „electronic property‟, such as video-on-demand, knowledge and 
information such as copyrights or trademarks, or identity devices such as 
biometric smart cards, would be the assets of interest in the future
20
. Naylor
21
 
had suggested that there had been a deal of hyperbole over the role of 
technology and argued that in the early to mid 19
th
 century the impact of the 
railway, steamship and telegraph was far more revolutionary than the Internet 
or mass air travel. Indeed, he noted, „…virtually every kind of crime now 
conducted through modern electronic communications technology had some 
equivalent in the telegraph age – which saw everything from insider trading to 
price fixing to financial fraud conducted by and through the telegraph, while 
telegraph companies faced problems of breaches of security by hackers 
threatening, in particular, telegraphic money transfers.‟22 Zittrain23 
convincingly argues that „[e]very technological development…has to varying 
degrees been a source of criminal opportunity, be it as a target or facilitator of 
criminal or malicious activity. Increasingly, however, we are seeing the 
compounding of criminal opportunity as technologies converge.‟ In support of 
this apparent convergence Sussman
24
 suggests that „[t]here is a revolution 
going on in criminal activity…The revolution lies in the ways that networked 
computers and other technologies permit crimes to be committed remotely, via 
the Internet and wireless communications.‟ Indeed, one might argue that the 
potential future of cybercrime sits within the broader digital environment, an 
environment created primarily to facilitate social and business relationships and 
transactions but one which is increasingly prone to degradation, infiltration and 
subsequent malfeasant activity. Although the precise future characteristics of 
cybercrime cannot be accurately determined it remains both possible and 
appropriate to frame potential cybercrime activities within the context of 
developments in technology more broadly and of the digital environment it 
supports and operates within.  
 
The target environment 
 
As suggested at the outset, logic alone would suggest that the digital 
environment will be increasingly targeted by traditional organised crime 
groups. The recognition by the business sector of the wealth of product 
placement opportunities available on the Internet will not have escaped the 
notice of traditional organised crime entities. Conversely, the extent to which 
there has been a major development in traditional organised criminal behaviour 
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and activity, as a direct or indirect result of cybercrime developments per se, is 
starting to be questioned.  
 
The Internet, for example, was never designed to be a highly developed or 
intelligent system. The basic purpose of the Internet, a vehicle for conveying 
packets of data between devices (the “end to end principle”), has remained 
unchanged and the resultant architecture, whilst embracing the original 
unfettered communication precept of the Internet, has facilitated an increasing 
vulnerability to inadvertent technical failings as well as advertent criminal and 
other malfeasants. It is clear that it is becoming less and less able to cope with 
the exponential demands, in terms of information storage and exchange, being 
placed upon it. In addition, globalisation requires, and will continue to 
necessitate, an increased connectivity of the world‟s computer, banking and 
financial systems. Globalisation has increased the free movement of capital 
between the world‟s developed and underdeveloped economies. Globalisation 
operates in cyberspace, which by definition is extraterritorial. This means that 
the regulatory practices which purport to exist and operate in the land-locked 
world, and which should be the sine qua non of the globalised economy, are 
missing. 
 
Furthermore, the Internet was never designed to be secure from exploitation. 
The strength of the Internet in terms of its rapid communication facility has 
become one of its undermining weaknesses. The criminal fraternity operates 
online under the same free market principles and the legislative and law 
enforcement endeavours launched against them suffer from geographical and 
practical restrictions.  The potential for an increase in the number of victims of 
economic crime, as well as cybercrime more broadly, is likely to rise. The 
dissemination, storage and protection of information lie at the heart of the 
Internet, e-commerce and the online environment per se.  Personal information 
about clients and customers is increasingly being lodged in digital 
documentation and that digital documentation is being routinely disseminated 
between computer networks. This distributed digital identity places 
confidential information in the ether with only the security processes of the 
organisation to prevent its exploitation. The acquisition and abuse of such 
information is likely to continue to form the basis of the future cyber crime 
threat. The sheer wealth of information likely to become available (if Google™ 
and similar search engines are any indication of future provision) to the average 
private user may, it is suggested
25, lead to the use of “knowbots” (knowledge 
robots) to navigate on a person‟s behalf through such data more effectively and 
even organise part of their daily routine such as scanning email for particular 
addresses or subject matter. The dangers of such knowbots being controlled by 
a malicious third party might of course facilitate the navigation of bank 
accounts etc with equal aplomb. A recent report
26
 has suggested that the new 
threat landscape may be typified by malware attacks which facilitate 
subsequent criminal endeavours. Attacks are deemed to be moving away from 
large affairs (such as global spam incidents) to smaller, more focused attacks 
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upon particular clients. The motivation has become largely profit-oriented and 
such attacks may facilitate those activities which increase profits most readily 
such as identity theft, fraud and extortion. Symantec noted
27
 that in the latter 
half of 2005, 80% of the top 50 reported threats could be used for data theft. 
„Unfortunately‟, it went on to observe, „it appears profit is the new motive for 
Internet threats, and the pride of one-upmanship – which used to inspire 
cyberattacks – is giving way to calculated criminal intent.‟ CipherTrust28 has 
supported this assertion by noting that „[w]hen information gained through 
phishing is sold, profits often get routed to international criminals and 
activities.‟  
 
Corresponding risks have of course been identified with advances in 
technology. Increasing dependency upon computer systems to control and 
operate key infrastructure may leave such control systems, and the populations 
who depend upon their effective operation, prone to the consequences of any 
subsequent breach. Importantly, the wider dissemination and availability of 
technology may render it a far easier task for criminals to engage fraud and 
fraud-related endeavours. 
 
Technology is destined to become increasingly ubiquitous. Established 
technologies such as mobile phones and computers will continue to widely 
used but there is likely to be a proliferation of auxiliary devices aimed at 
improving the performance and flexibility of those established products. The 
key threat emanating from the ubiquity and complexity of technology in an era 
of increasing connectivity will be viral contamination. This threat will be 
exacerbated by the reliance placed by businesses and individuals upon the 
technology to function in their daily lives. Communication vehicles will 
increase exponentially and the danger of such communication conduits being 
breached and exploited by cybercriminals is likely to rise in tandem. As the 
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice once noted
29
  „…as the 
degree of reliance placed on networks increases, the potential harm from 
criminal offences also increases.‟ 
 
The fact, for example, that the computer can be left permanently on and 
connected to the Internet, when coupled with the poor security awareness of 
many domestic users, renders such computers prone to criminal attack. The 
potential rationale for such attacks could include the obtaining of personal 
information for identity theft, the use of the computer as a „zombie‟ or storage 
facility for illegal material (as has been found to be the case with commercial 
and university systems). These dangers are likely to be exacerbated by 
activities such as peer-to-peer file sharing programs or the downloading of files 
from unknown senders. Rapid download times have also facilitated the 
dissemination of content such as pornographic images and pirated software and 
music particularly through Peer to peer (P2P) platforms. Most P2P software is 
free and it is believed may contain overt or covert advertising related software. 
There is a danger that the software may also contain spyware
30
. 
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The increasing use of mobile phones and PDAs (Personal Digital Assistants), 
each with ever-increasing storage capacity and ever-diminishing security 
protocols, constitute another potential threat. Such devices are routinely used to 
store personal data and corporate information and the advent of wireless 
networking increases the likelihood of such information being uploaded and 
downloaded. In 2005, twenty-two percent of people reported losing their 
mobile devices and of those 81 percent had not encrypted the information 
contained therein
31
. Wireless networks themselves may bring a number of 
vulnerabilities. Key amongst these is the fact that the network and its data can 
be accessed without physical access or presence being required. This facility 
assists the user but more importantly constitutes a positive boon to the criminal. 
Traditional organised groups in cyberspace 
 
Brenner
32
 has argued that „…nothing has been written about whether organized 
criminal activity will emerge in cyberspace and, if so, what forms it may 
take‟33 This may in part be attributed to the fact that traditional  organised 
crime groups „…evolved in the context of real-world endeavors [sic], mankind 
having lived exclusively in the real world until quite recently.‟ Nisbett34 has 
posited the notion that „[t]he current absence of organized cybercriminality 
makes a consideration whether organization will likely become an aspect of 
crime on the virtual frontier particularly topical and appropriate.‟ Given the 
assertions made concerning organised cybercrime, however, the capacity for, 
and desire of, traditional organised crime groups to engage in cybercrime 
should be evaluated. Brenner
35
 ascribes the relative lack of analysis of 
traditional organised crime intent and/or desire to engage in cyberspace to 
„…the perception that cybercrime is perpetrated by hackers, who are loners, 
and are therefore not inclined to engage in group criminality; and the fact that, 
to date, most documented cybercrime reveals that a majority of incidents 
involve individuals, not groups.‟36 Given also the fact that it is the application 
and definition of the word „organised‟, which has caused much of the current 
disquiet, discussion ought to be had as to whether the structures of traditional 
organised crime groups could, or would, conform to the rather sleeker 
organisational models deemed essential for the smooth infiltration and 
exploitation of cyberspace. Nisbett
37
 suggests that „…empirical differences 
between the real world and the cyberworld will prevent the effective transfer of 
existing forms of real-world criminal organization modalities into cyberspace.‟ 
For Nisbett
38
  „…the very nature of cyberspace is inconsistent with hierarchy. 
Cyberspace is a network, or, more properly, a network of networks. Networks 
are lateral, diffuse, fluid, and evolving. Hierarchies are vertical, concentrated, 
and tend to be rigid and fixed.‟ This seemingly presumes, however, that 
traditional organised crime groups retain the degree of hierarchical structure 
which Cressey
39
 asserted, and Valachi
40
 confirmed, in the 1960s.  
 
It is recognised that in fact, flatter, more horizontal networks, comprising cell-
like „crews‟, have become the norm in much of the organised crime 
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environment (though Chinese triads and Japanese yakuza have remained 
traditionally hierarchical in nature) with the United Nations
41
 having identified 
a number of structural variations within organised crime groups. Nisbett
42
 
suggests that „[l]ogically, the first issue to consider when analysing forms 
criminal organization may take in cyberspace is the extent to which already-
evolved forms of criminal organization are likely to migrate to the virtual 
frontier. Since the already-evolved forms of criminal organization have proven 
successful in the real world, it is reasonable to expect that they will enjoy at 
least a measure of success in the cyberworld.‟ The flexibility of the 
organisation and control of traditional crime groups has in part derived from a 
proactive reaction by such groups to law enforcement endeavours and 
operations against such groups.  Whilst one might argue that such structural 
changes have resulted more from the necessity of protection than through 
freedom of choice, this demonstrated ability to make such organisational 
changes augurs well for similar adaptations to be made by traditional organised 
crime groups in reaction to, and after reflection of, changes in their operating 
environment, namely, cyberspace. Olson
43
 maintains that „[o]rganized crime is 
perfectly suited to profit from the information revolution. Its existence relies on 
innovating, adapting strategies and operations, and evading detection. These 
attributes complement the ever-changing nature and unpredictability of the 
information revolution. The Internet offers an array of lucrative opportunities 
with little or no risk.‟ 
 
Europol
44
 has indeed suggested that, at the meta level, „[t]he advantages the 
internet offers in terms of information and communication technology are 
extremely beneficial to [organised crime]. The underground cultures built 
around some  of the high technology phenomena such as hacking and cracking 
are perfect for support, contacts, recruitment, advice and clients.‟ By way of 
tacit support for such a notion, McAfee
45
 asserts that „[o]rganised crime gangs 
are starting to actively recruit skilled young people into cybercrime. They are 
adopting KGB-style tactics to recruit high flying IT students and graduates and 
targeting computer society members, students of specialist computer skills 
schools and graduates of IT technology courses.‟ For Williams46, the transition 
of traditional organised crime from the physical to the virtual environment is as 
much about a natural progression in criminal behaviour as it is about a 
determined course of action given the fact that as „[o]rganized crime has 
always selected particular industries as targets for infiltration and the exercise 
of illicit influence…[f]rom an organized crime perspective, the Internet and the 
growth of e-commerce present a new set of targets for infiltration and the 
exercise of influence…‟ 
 
Conversely, there has been a degree of rumination over whether the „organised 
crime in cyberspace‟ versus „crime in cyberspace which is organised‟ debate is 
itself being taken over rapidly by events. Clarberg
47
 has pointed out that 
„…high technology crime is often not a crime in isolation, and forms part of a 
crime which is also occurring within the physical world. It is very difficult to 
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find a real world crime that does not have a high technology element, even if it 
is as common and straightforward as the use of a mobile telephone.‟ 
 
There have also been suggestions that in fact, as with the purported
48
 
convergence of organised crime and terrorism in light of perceived mutual 
benefits, the two sides of the „organised‟ debate may in fact find greater solace, 
reward and operational fluidity through a combination of their efforts. Olson
49
 
maintains that „[e]lements of both the cybercrime and organized crime worlds 
have encouraged the two to merge. Hackers were traditionally anti-social 
loners, operating without any monetary motivation. Their motivations have 
now shifted from mere curiosity to more self-serving and lucrative attacks. But 
hackers now frequently work together in loosely knit units or cells.‟ 
Furthermore, she notes that „[m]any of the characteristics traditionally 
attributed to organized crime can also be attributed to cybercriminals and 
hackers. This overlap in skill and motivation has created a natural bond 
between the two underground networks.‟50  
 
The possible redundancy of the term ‘organised’ 
 
More radically still is the notion that the intrinsic nature of cyberspace will in 
fact alter the very notion of the term „organised‟ whether applied within the 
context of organised crime of the traditional-oriented or cyber-born 
complexion. Nisbett
51
 has observed a truism that „[i]n the cyberworld…one‟s 
aptitude as a cybercriminal is a function of his or her technical 
expertise…While there may be opportunistic reasons to affiliate with a 
cybercriminal group, such an affiliation is not essential for the pursuit of a 
criminal career, as it is for members of real-world gangs.‟ As Brenner52 has 
it,„[t]he characteristics of cyberspace, the absence of fixed, empirical 
constraints and a diffuse, fluid, evolving environment, indicate that hierarchical 
organizational structures are at once not needed in and not appropriate for 
activities conducted in cyberspace. What, then, will criminal organization look 
like in cyberspace?...will organized criminal activity in cyberspace ever 
actually exist?‟ 
 
Some authors have posited that cybercrime itself may alter the structure of 
traditional organised crime groups. The Council of Europe
53
 notes, for 
example, that „[c]ybercrime requires less control over a geographical territory, 
less violence and intimidation, less personal contacts and thus less relationships 
based on trust and enforcement of discipline between criminals, in short less 
need for formal organisations.‟ Brenner54 has suggested that „[o]nline criminal 
organization will tend to de-emphasize formal, hierarchical organizational 
structures. At the same time, it will emphasize a broader, lateral contextual 
structure. Online criminal organization has no reason to be circumscribed, in its 
membership or in its operations, by national, territorial boundaries or by 
cultural differences because cybercriminals…share a culture that transcends 
national borders and context. So, as opposed to the localized, rigid, and often 
 11 
provincial hierarchical organizations that have so far characterized criminal 
groups, regional, or even global, coalitions will develop.‟ 
 
Such coalitions are likely to comprise a mixture of „…cybercrime 
entrepreneurs…‟ and „…diffuse, loosely-structured opportunity groups…‟55 
which are, in a manner currently typical of „Russian‟ organised crime groups in 
the physical environment, likely to collude in relation to a specific offence and 
thereafter disband. The ties that bind and typify traditional organised crime 
groups in terms of membership criteria and strategic alliances are likely to 
become less constricting. The „…traditional indicia of commitment, and of 
membership, will decline in importance. Instead of multi-generational criminal 
enterprises, cybercriminal organization will emphasize arm‟s length, 
instrumental associative alliances.‟56 
 
Traditional organised crime online or online crimes which are organised? 
 
The catalyst behind the current debate concerning traditional organised crime 
online, or online crime that is organised, is the nature and quality of evidence 
adduced in support of either and/or both camps. As a point of origin, Clarberg
57
 
has asserted that „[t]here is very little, if any quantitative data available for 
assessment of the size and impact of high-technology crime…‟ That of course 
has not prevented the production of a wealth of information asserting its 
existence, its composition and its impacts. Williams
58
 once suggested that  
 „[t]he synergy between organized crime and the Internet is not only natural but 
also one that is likely to flourish and develop even further in the future.‟ He 
posited that safe havens used in the physical environment are likely to be 
replaced with similar havens in the cyberworld and that the Internet provides a 
range of criminal opportunities in terms particularly of the commission of old 
crimes in new ways as envisaged by Grabosky
59
. In essence, Williams 
maintained that „…[t]he Internet provides both channels and targets for crime 
and enables them to be exploited for considerable gain with a very low level of 
risk. For organized crime it is difficult to ask for more.‟ 
 
These observations and assertions reflect the logic component of the tension 
noted above
60
 and indeed Williams
61
 conceded that „[m]ost organized crime 
will continue to operate in the real world rather than the cyberworld and most 
cybercrime will be perpetrated by individuals rather than criminal 
organizations per se.‟ This position reflects the oft-neglected issue of 
motivation, that is, what might prompt organised crime groups to gravitate 
away from the target- rich physical environment to the relatively unknown 
quantity of the virtual world?  Nevertheless, Williams
62
 maintained, „…the 
degree of overlap between the two phenomena is likely to increase 
considerably in the next few years‟ and argued that „…there is growing 
evidence that organized crime groups are exploiting the new opportunities 
offered by the Internet.‟ The potential problem of Williams‟ assertion is not 
that it might not be accurate (which, given Williams‟ reputation, is highly 
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unlikely) but rather that the evidence adduced publicly to support that assertion 
is not conspicuously nor overwhelmingly present. Assertions without cited 
supportive evidence are quickly transformed into hearsay and anecdote which 
are in turn recycled within other authors‟ assertions concerning cybercriminal 
activity. At the point at which citations by one author, of examples provided by 
another (who may not have provided tangible evidence for those examples), 
become the norm, the task of distinguishing the true nature of cybercriminal 
behaviour from its presumed characteristics will becomes an increasingly 
difficult task. Furthermore, the capacity for law enforcement agencies to 
engage with the relatively unknown quantity of „organised‟ cybercrime amidst 
a plethora of contradictory and unsubstantiated or under substantiated reports 
and conjecture will be further diminished.   
 
A number of generic cyber crime threats have been identified
63
 consisting of: 
 
(1) offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems (via activities such as hacking, deception, 
interception and espionage) 
(2) computer-related „traditional‟ crimes (fraud and forgery), content-
related computer offences (such as website defacement and 
dissemination of false information) and  
(3) offences relating to the infringement of copyright and related rights 
(such as the unauthorised reproduction and use of programmes and 
databases)  
 
Given the accepted precept that opportunity, tempered by an evaluation of 
relative risk, provides the key incentive to criminal endeavour, logic, if not 
evidence, would suggest that traditional organised crime groups and/or 
networks are fully engaged in the exploitation of the cyber environment. An 
oft-cited example
64
 of the systemic nature of transnational organised crime 
groups‟ lateral thinking and exploitative powers was witnessed in October 2000 
when a Sicilian mafia group, together with twenty other strategically placed 
individuals, created a digital clone of the Bank of Sicily‟s online component. 
Its plan, thwarted at the last moment by an informant, involved the diversion of 
$400 million allocated to the Bank by the European Union for regional projects 
within Sicily. The fact that the group tried and failed is not the key issue 
debated. That they actually conceived the idea is. Sadly, this example has often 
been cited as evidence of organised cybercrime and whilst it undoubtedly 
indicates a propensity for such crime by organised crime groups it remains in 
desperate need of the company of related organised crime endeavours to 
strengthen and/or clarify the debate. As Morris
65
 argues „[d]espite the diverse 
and often interconnectedness of many of the threats and challenges that have 
been highlighted [in the Future of Netcrime Survey], this complexity should 
not obscure the fact that much of what is seen is merely old crimes committed 
in new ways. Human motivations, needs and frailties are relatively consistent. 
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Criminals and offenders are largely driven by finding ways of making 
money…‟ 
 
Parizo
66
 suggests that there is a common misconception in relation to 
cybercrime that „…organized crime on the Internet manifests itself just like 
traditional mafia.‟ According to Peretti67 (of the US Department of Justice 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Division) „…it is virtually 
impossible to find any true crime families in cyberspace.‟ Indeed, in annual 
reviews and prognoses of future conduct, the level of actual or perceived 
involvement by organised crime groups in cybercrime remains peripheral to 
other traditional activities such as the trafficking of arms, drugs and people. 
However, such reports do note a connection between cyberspace and traditional 
organised crime but this is largely in the context of using cyberspace to 
facilitate old physical rather than new virtual criminality. It has been argued
68
 
that „…only a few cases are known in which organised crime elements have 
been active in the area of criminal offences against the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of computer data and systems.‟ Conversely, in relation 
to computer-related traditional crimes „[o]rganised crime groups are especially 
involved in acts of sophisticated computer fraud, credit card fraud, and 
telephone fraud.‟69 The Council of Europe70 argues that „[i]n the area of 
content-related offences, organised crime groups are heavily involved in the 
production and distribution of child pornography.‟  
 
Europol also notes
71
 that „[organised crime] groups rely on fast and secure 
means of communication. E-mail, internet chat rooms and instant messaging all 
offer new opportunities, as do web-based and client server mail accounts, 
websites and message boards. It provides speed of communication and, 
combined with encryption tools, offer unprecedented security for the data they 
store and exchange.‟ Furthermore, the Criminal Intelligence Service of Canada 
(CISC)
72
 suggests that „[t]echnology facilitates increasingly secure, anonymous 
and rapid communication, through tools like encryption software, wireless 
devices, encrypted cellular phones and anonymous re-mailers that forwards 
emails without revealing their origins. Criminal groups exploit tools like this to 
plan and undertake criminal activities, such as drug trafficking, without 
physical interactions, thereby reducing the risks of detection and prosecution.‟ 
 
 In 2006, a joint US/Canadian organised crime threat assessment noted
73
 that 
criminal enterprises and loosely organised criminal networks perpetrate identity 
theft throughout Canada and the US. It suggested that „…new technologies and 
the Internet provide identity thieves with innovative tools for acquiring large 
amounts of personal data with minimal effort.‟74 Asian Organized Crime 
Groups are deemed to have successfully combined „traditional‟ activities such 
as extortion to technology related crimes including „…sophisticated credit card 
fraud, counterfeiting, and thefts of high tech components, such as computer 
chips.‟75 
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In 2005, the CISC argued
76
 that „[o]rganized crime groups are broadening their 
exploitation of technological vulnerabilities by targeting individuals and 
businesses that rely on technology, e-commerce and the on-line storage of 
valuable personal, financial and intellectual property data.‟ In 2006, the CISC 
reiterated this belief by suggesting that „[c]riminal groups are increasingly 
targeting communication devices to obtain sensitive personal and financial 
information in order to undertake theft and fraud.‟77 
 
Europol noted
78
 that „[t]echnology is increasingly becoming a main facilitator 
of [organised crime]. New types of fraud such as data streaming of payment 
card details have emerged in recent years, and traditional forms of crime such 
as money laundering, drug sales, the dissemination of child abuse material and 
prostitution have evolved as a result of technological developments. The 
Internet has had an especially profound effect on crime.‟ The Serious 
Organised Crime Agency has noted
79
 that „[s]erious organized criminals are 
exploiting the Internet as a commercial medium as well as for their 
communications.‟ The use of botnets has also been attributed to organised 
crime groups and Hynds
80
 has noted that „[t]he trade of BotNets on 
compromised machines is becoming an industry in itself. Organized crime is 
making use of this industry.‟ 
The Financial Action Task Force has indicated 
81
 a new and prospective avenue 
for the illicit transfer of money (or more appropriately „value‟) is that of new 
payment methods (NPTs) such as internet payment systems, mobile payments 
and digital precious metals. Designed primarily to facilitate cross-border funds 
transfer they contain a number of potential risk factors given that the 
distribution channel is the internet, that no face to face contact with the 
„customer‟ occurs (a process known as disintermediation) and that the NPM 
process operates through an open and accessible network.  
In 2001, Kubic
82
 of the FBI Criminal Investigative Division argued that „[a]s 
worldwide dependence on technology increases, high-tech crime is becoming 
an increasingly attractive source of revenue for organized crime groups, as well 
as an attractive option for them to make commercial and financial transactions 
that support criminal activity.‟ Suggestions that organised crime groups 
recognise the benefits and utility of the Internet may be found in recent 
reports
83
 which argue that criminals are targeting universities, computer clubs 
and online forums to find students to write computer viruses, commit identity 
theft and launder money (money mules). McAfee
84
 maintains that „[a]lthough 
organised criminals may have less of the expertise needed to commit 
cybercrimes, they have the funds to buy the necessary people to do it for them.‟ 
Stone argues
85
  that „[c]yber criminals have advanced from fairly simple virus 
writing to more clever attacks, sometimes using more than one attack 
mechanism. These range from elaborate note phishing scams…;fraudulent 
spam that launches viruses or spyware; and malware such as Trojans, which 
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enable criminals to take remote control over thousands of computers for 
massive, distributed attacks.‟  
 
Equally, there are law enforcement representatives and/or reports drawing upon 
law enforcement assertions which support the notion of traditional organised 
crime involvement in cybercrime. In 2001 the FBI announced
86
 that ongoing 
computer hacking by organized crime groups in Russia and the Ukraine had 
resulted in more than 1 million stolen credit card numbers. McCafferty 
suggested
87
 that „[o]rganized criminals work together, with clearly defined 
roles. The execution is as finely crafted as the best of business plans. The 
capital investment is staggering.‟ In support of this assertion McCafferty88 cited 
the example of Kansas based company, Lexitrans. Officials there were indicted 
in February 2004 after allegedly running a shell-company operation to market 
adult websites and 900 numbers that advertised for free trials but instead 
charged the unwary user. The illegal business generated US $750 million and 
Lexitrans and its shell companies were linked to the Gambino crime family.  
 
Fisher
89
 has argued, on the basis of information relayed by Larkin of the Cyber 
Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit (FBI), that organised crime groups range 
from „…so-called traditional organized crime groups, such as the Russian and 
Eastern European mafia, to loosely affiliated crews who pool their resources 
and skills in online forums.‟ Neate90 (the e-crime liaison for the United 
Kingdom‟s Serious Organised Crime Agency - SOCA) noted in 2006 that 
„[organized crime] has changed. [There is] still…traditional organized crime, 
but now they have learned to compromise employees and contractors. [They 
are] new-age, maybe have computer degrees and are enterprising themselves. 
They have a wide circle of associates and new structures.‟ 
 
Horn
91
 argues that „[c]yber crime is rapidly evolving from the domain of 
misguided pranksters, to elaborate, profit-driven schemes involving organized-
crime syndicates that may be based around the block, or halfway around the 
world.‟ Hynds92, formerly of the United Kingdom‟s National High Tech Crime 
Unit (recently absorbed into SOCA) argued in 2002 that „[w]e now have 
reliable intelligence showing major drugs and arms traffickers using 
sophisticated and disciplined methods of communication using internet relay 
chat and ICQ (I seek you) protocols as well as encrypted emails.‟ He 
suggested
93
 that in addition „[w]e are also seeing these groups using hacking 
skills to access and compromise IT systems, in order to secrete their illicit 
material on the servers of unsuspecting businesses.‟ 
 
APACS
94
 has argued that „[t]he primary threat to UK e-banking services has 
come from eastern European crime gangs…[which] have managed to meld 
their criminal skills along with the technology skills of a ready pool of highly 
educated IT professionals to find ways of developing many criminal business 
streams from the internet.‟ In an indication of increasing mastery over the 
transition from syntactic (targeting the computer) to semantic (targeting the 
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computer user) attacks, the use of people to transfer drugs and/or money, a long 
standing practice of the criminal fraternity, is being replicated in the 
cybercrime environment. „Money mules‟ (ostensibly innocent people unrelated 
to the criminal activity that creates the illicit funds) transfer relatively small 
amounts of money lodged in their bank accounts to overseas accounts held by 
criminals. Money mules are a consequence of the need for criminals to transfer, 
and disguise the origins of, illicit proceeds of crime. Money mules seem to be 
recruited largely from the US, UK and Australia and transfer illegal funds to 
criminals located primarily, in the former Soviet Union
95
. 
Conclusion 
 
 There are undoubtedly criminal elements (known colloquially as „super-
empowered criminals‟) operating in the online environment as obtainers and 
disseminators of identity and identity-related information. Operation Firewall
96
, 
for example, in 2004 in the US and Canada culminated in the arrest of 28 
people from six countries for offences including the buying and selling of 1.7 
million credit card numbers. Such groups may be typified as criminal 
individuals and/or groups online who are organised rather than traditional 
organised crime groups who are online. It seems certain, however, that 
traditional organised crime groups are nevertheless prepared to pay for such 
information in order to facilitate the commission of physical rather than virtual 
crimes. However, it remains unclear, and indeed doubtful, whether currently 
there are traditional organised crime groups operating within the cyber 
environment. Equally, it seems likely that traditional organised crime groups 
will not shy away from using the cyber environment to facilitate the operation, 
and / or to disguise the illicit proceeds, of physical world-based crimes. The 
use, for example, of denial of service attacks to pursue extortion, of online 
banking to transfer laundered funds and the use of malware and/or botnet 
operators to acquire pertinent personal information for use in identity related 
financial crime is likely to continue to develop. The wholesale or partial 
mutation of traditional organised crime groups into fully-fledged 
cybercriminals will ultimately be determined as much by the diminished 
profitability, or increased risk, of real world criminal activities as it will by the 
innate attractiveness and relatively low risk of virtual criminality.  
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